A construction principle for natural deduction systems for arbitrary finitely-many-valued first order logics is exhibited. These systems are systematically obtained from sequent calculi, which in turn can be automatically extracted from the truth tables of the logics under consideration. Soundness and cut-free completeness of these sequent calculi translate into soundness, completeness and normal form theorems for the natural deduction systems.
Introduction
The study of natural deduction systems for manyvalued logics can be motivated by the following two issues: (1) Many-valued logics provide a general framework for the investigation of properties of classical (two-valued) sytems. (2) A general construction of sound and complete natural deduction calculi leads to an adequate syntactical (proof-theoretic) characterization of many-valued logics for which one wants to emphasize the r61e of a particular truth value. (For standard logics, such as the families of Godel und Lukasiewicz logics, one usually considers such distinguished truth values.)
We consider finitely-many-valued first order logics with arbitrary truth-functional connectives and distribution quantifiers (see Definition 2.2). A natural deduction derivation for a logic with the truth values Every sequent rule introducing a formula at a nondistinguished position is converted into an elimination rule; the sequent rule introducing a formula at the distinguished position is transformed into an introduction rule (in the sense of natural deduction). Any natural deduction derivation can be translated into a derivation of the corresponding sequent calculus. On the other hand, any cut-free sequent calculus proof translates into a normal natural deduction derivation. (Here normal means that for no branch of the proof tree an elimination follows an introduction; this excludes maximal segments in the sense of PRAWITZ [1971] .) Consequently, the natural deduction sytems are sound and complete and every derivation can be transformed into a normal derivation. Such derivations consist of "analytical" paths. A valuation va1M is a mapping that extends the interpretation to formulas via the truth functions given in the matrix. We only give the precise definition of the valuation function for a quantified formula:
Preliminaries
where U is a new free variable, and M ( d / a ) is defined as the interpretation equal to M, except that . . . , A ( a p ) } U { A ( t l ) , . . . , A ( t 4 ) } , the are metavariables for free variables (the eigenvariables of the rule) satisfying the condition that they do not occur in the lower sequent, the tk are metavariables for terms, and the following condition holds:
Sequent calculi
Let M be an interpretation. Then the following are equivalent:
(1) ( Q z ) A ( z ) takes the truth value vi under M.
(2) For all d l , . . . , dp E D, there are terms t i , . . . , The truth function for a quantifier Q immediately yields introduction rules for place i in a way similar to the method described-above for connectives: Let 
I rm,Am
A sequent is provable in a given sequent calculus, if there is an upward tree of sequents s.t. every topmost sequent is an axiom and every other sequent is obtained from the ones standing immediately above it by an application of one of the rules.
THEOREM (Soundness)
For every sequent calculus in the sense o f Definition 3.7 the following holds: I f a sequent is provable, then it is valid.
Proof.
By induction on the length of proofs (see BAAZ et al. [1993] ). 0 3.9. THEOREM (Completeness) For every sequent calculus in the sense of Definition 3.7 the following holds: If a sequent is valid, then it is provable without cuts from atomic axioms.
Proof.
SCHUTTE (see BAAZ et al. [1993]).
By the method of reduction trees, due t o 0 4 Natural deduction systems GENTZEN [1934] formulated natural deduction for intuitionistic logic as the system NJ. In correspondence with the intuitionistic sequent calculus LJ, where the right side of a sequent is restricted to at most one formula, NJ deals with inferences of one conclusion from a set of assumptions. At the application of rules, assumptions of a certain form can be cancelled in parts of the proof. A proof of a formula is a deduction tree where all assuptions have been cancelled.
Natural deduction for classical logic N K is obtained from N J by adding tertium non datur. Alternatively, one can drop the restriction to one formula in the conclusion and allow sets of formulas (cf. PARIGOT [1992]). We generalize this classical multi-conclusion system of natural deduction to the m-valued case. The formulas in square brackets are those which can be cancelled at this inference.
EXAMPLE The introduction rule for 2 in the logic
The elimination rule at place * is:
n , A > B n ' , A n" n, U ' , n"
The elimination rule at place f is: The elimination rule Q:Ei for Q a t place i < m is given by:
where M P denotes the major premise of the form:
The eigenvariables in A{ must not occur in TI, F l , . . . , rm, r,!,, nor in (Qt)A(z). In the classical case, a derivation of a formula F from an assumption A has the intuitive meaning of as- 4.6. DEFINITION In an elimination, the premises (sets of formulas) containing the formula to be eliminated are called major premises, the other premises are called minor premises.
We call a formula occurence A the conclusion formula of an introduction, if it is the formula being introduced, a premise formula of an introduction, if it is one of the formulas in A; in that introduction, the major premise formula of an elimination, if it is the formula being eliminated, a minor premise formula of an elimination, if it is among the formulas in Ah in that elimination, a cancelled assumption formula of an elimination, if it stands immediatley below, an assumption which contains the formulas in Ai (1 5 j 5 m-1) being cancelled at that elimination.
A formula occurence A is said to follow A', if both are of the same form and A' stands immediately above A . Taking { A ( t ) } for A' and 0 for r', we obtain Parigot's rule by disregarding the redundant right premise.
Normal derivations
A maximum segment in the intuitionistic natural deduction calculus NJ is a sequence of formulas in a derivation that starts with an introduction and end with an elimination. In the classical, multi-conclusion system, it is a sequence starting with an introduction of a formula and ending in an elimination acting on the same formula. A maximum segment constitutes a redundancy in the proof. In NJ, and also in multivalued natural deduction, there are always proofs without such redundancies (see PRAWITZ [1971] ). DEFINITION A sequence A I , . . . , A , of occurrences of one and the same formula is called a maximum segment, if A1 is the conclusion formula of an introduction, Aj+l stands immediately below A j , and A, is the the major premise formula in an elimination.
5.1.

DEFINITION
A normal derivation is a natural deduction derivation where no major premise of an elimination stands below an introduction. 
